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This paper analyzes the eﬀect of severance payments on the probability of separation at
given tenure, wages and other individual and ﬁrm characteristics. It studies a mandatory
deferred wage scheme of the Italian labour market (Trattamento di Fine Rapporto, TFR).
Deferred wages increase job duration if two conditions hold: wages are rigidly set outside
the employer-employee relationship, and past provisions are accumulated at interest rates
that are below market rates. Under such circumstances, workers who withdraw from their
accumulated stock of unpaid wages should experience, at given tenure, a subsequent in-
crease in the probability of separation. This prediction appears empirically robust and
quantitatively sizeable. A withdrawal of 60% of the TFR stock 60% of the TFR stock (the
median observed withdrawal) increases the instantaneous hazard rate by almost 20%. In
other words, an individual with at least ten years of tenure that experiences an early with-
drawal increases his/her hazard rate from 10% to about 12%. The empirical result takes
into account the existence of unobserved heterogeneity and a variety of further robustness
tests.
JEL Classiﬁcation: J0, J3, J6
Keywords: labor markets, severance payments, wage schemes, job tenure, job separation1I n t r o d u c t i o n
More stringent Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) should induce labour hoarding from the
ﬁrm stand-point: other things equal, employer initiated separations should be lower for individuals
with stricter EPL1. While such theoretical prediction is unambiguous, little is known on the em-
pirical links between EPL and separation rates at the job level2. Indeed, two empirical regularities
prevent straightforward identiﬁcation of the theoretical prediction. On the one hand, it is well
established that the probability of job termination declines markedly with tenure (Farber 1999),
independently of the presence of severance payments. On the other hand, severance payments
increase with job tenure. As a result, it is very diﬃcult to identify the eﬀect of severance payments
on labour hoarding and employer initiated separation. This paper exploits an institutional feature
of the Italian labour market that makes it possible to identify this eﬀect at the micro level.
Traditional severance payments, deﬁned as statutory ﬁrm worker transfers in case of ﬁrm initi-
ated separation, do not exist in Italy (Brandolini and Torrini, 2002). Nevertheless, Italy features
a mandatory deferred wage (Trattamento Fine Rapporto, TFR hereafter ) that can be akin to a
severance payment. It is paid to the worker at the end of the employment relationship, regardless of
the reasons behind the separation. During the entire working relationship, the worker accumulates
a credit vis-à-vis the ﬁrm, which is in turn obliged to recapitalize its debt to the worker at policy
determined interest rates. Over the last twenty years, such policy determined interest rates have
been traditionally very low, so that TFR resulted in subsidized ﬁnancing of ﬁrm operations from
the part of workers. We solve a simple partial equilibrium model of job destruction with deferred
wages, and show that deferred wages are akin to a severance payment. As long as wages are rigidly
set outside the employer-employee relationship, and deferred wages are accumulated below market
rates (both conditions held in Italy during our observation period), a scheme like TFR increases
the ﬁrm propensity to hoard labour. As a way to keep the subsidized ﬁnancing on the part of
workers, ﬁrms have incentives to delay job separation and to increase the average duration of jobs.
The latter result suggests that TFR has the same eﬀects of a severance payment with ﬁxed wages,
and appears equivalent to a piece of employment protection legislation.
Within the existing institutional setting workers are allowed to proceed to an advance with-
drawal of their accumulated credit. Our theoretical model clearly predicts that following a random
shock, workers who withdraw from their accumulated credit of unpaid wages increase the proba-
bility of a ﬁrm initiated separation. This suggests that we can empirically identify the eﬀect of
1See for example, Nickell, 1986; Bentolila and Bertola, 1990 and Bertola 1999; Hopenhayn-Rogerson, 1993;
Ljungqvist, 2001.
2A possible example is Kugler (1999), who studies the eﬀect of changes in ﬁring costs in Colombia.
1severance payments on the probability of separation, at given tenure, wages and other individ-
ual and ﬁrm characteristics. Our empirical analysis suggests that such eﬀect is both sizeable and
robust.
We rely on the Work Histories Italian Panel (WHIP), a longitudinal micro dataset drawn from
the social security administration (INPS) archives and processed in a public-use ﬁle by LABORa-
torio Revelli3. Using information on about 20,000 employment spells initiated between 1985 and
1988 and followed up to 1999, we test the impact of advance withdrawals on the hazard rate, i.e.
on the probability of ﬁrm initiated separation between t and t +1conditional on having a tenure
of at least t, using a variety of survival models. Overall, we ﬁnd that withdrawing from the TFR
fund signiﬁcantly increases the hazard rate, even when we control for wages, industry and occupa-
tional eﬀects. Our results are also quantitatively non negligible. A withdrawal of 60% of the TFR
stock (the median observed withdrawal) increases the instantaneous hazard rate by almost 20%. In
other words, an individual with at least ten years of tenure that experiences an advance withdrawal
increases his/her hazard rate from 10% to about 12%. We perform a variety of robustness checks,
focussing mainly on unobserved heterogeneity and reverse causality, and we ﬁnd our results robust.
Our results are also relevant in the policy debate. The social security reforms approved by the
Italian Parliament in 2004 and 2006 envisage a two pillar system. The ﬁrst pillar will be a national
pension. The second pillar will be made by private pension schemes. The 2006 law considers the
TFR as a base payment to ﬁll up the private pension funds. Our results suggest that a shift of
TFRfunds into pension funds will increase labour turnover, so that implementing such reform will
have a direct eﬀect in the social security area, and an indirect eﬀect on the labour market.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the Italian institutional setting, with par-
t i c u l a re m p h a s i so nt h ee x i s t e n c eo fd e f e r r e dw a g e s .S e c t i o n3p r e s e n t sam o d e lo fs t o c h a s t i ca n d
dynamic job destruction with deferred wages, while section 4 characterizes a simple version of the
model, and derives a key empirical implication. Section 5 presents the data and sample design. Sec-
tion 6 describes our empirical methodology and econometric issues. Section 7 presents the empirical
results while section 8 concludes.
2 Deferred Wages in the Italian Institutional Setting
In the literature on employment protection legislation, statutory severance payments are deﬁned as
mandatory payments (monetary transfers) to which a worker is entitled in case he or she is dismissed
without fault of his or her own. In practice, beyond statutory payments, collective bargaining can
3www.laboratoriorevelli.it/whip
2and do set additional severance payments to which workers are entitled in case of redundancy.
As was pointed out by Brandolini and Torrini (2002), Italy does not feature any mandatory
severance payment4. In the Italian institutional setting, employment restrictions take the form
of an-in-kind protection that forces ﬁrms to rehire unlawfully dismissed workers (reinstatement
clause). Individual dismissal for economic reasons is contemplated by the law and it can be carried
out at no cost. Yet, dismissed individuals have the right to appeal employer initiated separations.
Ultimately, a court ruling decides whether a speciﬁc dismissal is admissible. Previous research has
focused on such restriction. Ichino et al. (2003) argue that judges are biased by labour market
conditions in their court ruling. Garibaldi et al. (2004) study the eﬀe c to fas i z et h r e s h o l di nt h e
reinstatement clause, and ﬁnd that there is some evidence of an increase in employment persistence
around the threshold, but the size of the eﬀect is quantitatively small.
This paper studies a deferred wage scheme, called Trattamento di Fine Rapporto (Remuneration
upon Separation, TFRin the rest of the paper). TFRis an amount of money to which the worker is
entitled at the end of the employment relationship, regardless of the cause beyond the job separation
(quit, layoﬀ, retirement, even ﬁring for cause). The TFRis technically deﬁned as a fraction of the
yearly wage that is paid to all employees (including those under probation) with a time delay. It
is a sum of yearly provisions that are explicitly included in the ﬁrm’s balance sheet (and so they
are part of the labor cost for accounting purposes) and it is periodically re-valuated. For each year
of service, a provision of two twenty-seventh (or 1/13.5) of the yearly gross salary is included in
the individual TFRaccount, and is re-valuated yearly according to the following coeﬃcients: 1.5%
ﬁxed plus 75% of the CPI inﬂation of the previous year. In legal terms, the TFRis a credit from
t h ee m p l o y e et ot h eﬁrm, and it is guaranteed by the social security administration in case the ﬁrm
goes bankrupt.
Under normal circumstances, the TFR is paid to the worker at the time of job separation.
Nevertheless, workers have the right to withdraw up to 70% of the TFR in advance if several
conditions hold. First and foremost, they must have at least 8 years of tenure; second, they have
to use the advance payment only for health related expenses, for buying a house, or for speciﬁc
periods of unpaid leave (e.g. training). Finally, the advance withdrawal is a right on the part
of the worker as long as less than 10% of the eligible workers in the ﬁrm apply, and as long as
it corresponds to less than 4% of the total workforce; this implies that ﬁrms below 25 employees
may be exempted from this obligation5. Failure to meet these conditions requires that the advance
4While there are no statutory severance payments, collective agreements do set severance payments when the
parties bargain over layoﬀs. No oﬃcial survey is available on the size of these transfers or on the frequency of these
events. In this work we focus on a diﬀerent, universal, institution that is akin to a severance payment and whose
eﬀects may be added to bargained severance payments when they exist.
5The legislation says that early withdrawal is a worker’s right as long as it is requested by "less than 10 percent
3withdrawal is approved by the employer. In fact, workers do withdraw their individual accounts
through employer approval. We observe about 2% of employees withdrawing before the 8th year
of tenure, while this share increases to 5-6% afterward.
From the ﬁrm standpoint, the policy determined interest rate implies a subsidized ﬁnancing of
ﬁrm operation. Between 1988 and 1999, the years on which we will base our empirical analysis, the
best rate available in the banking system was approximately ten percentage points higher than the
ﬁnancial cost of the TFR. This is clearly visible in Table 1, where we report the implicit ex-post
interest rate of the TFRas well as the prime rate available in the banking system. From the worker
standpoint, the outside riskless option is a ﬁnancial investment in long term government bonds. As
shown in Table 1, between 1988 and 1999 the average long term rate on government bonds is some
8 percent higher than the rate of the TFR. This suggests that workers face a ﬁnancial opportunity
cost induced by the institutional setting.
Table 1: Prime Rates and Policy Determined Interest Rate for Recapitalizing TFR stocks
year Policy ˜ r a Market r b T-Bill rtb
c
1988 5.596 13.00 10.6
1989 6.387 14.00 10.9
1990 6.28 13.00 12.8
1991 6.032 12.50 13.5
1992 5.068 16.25 13.3
1993 4.491 10.38 11.2
1994 4.542 9.38 10.4
1995 5.851 11.50 12.2
1996 3.422 10.75 9.4
1997 2.643 9 6.9
1998 2.626 7.875 4.9
a Policy Determined Yearly Capitalization rate for TFR
b Market Determined Annual Prime Rate
c Long Term Annual Rate on Government Bonds
Source: Authors’ calculation, and Datastream.
3 Job Destruction with Deferred Wages
This section develops a simple model of deferred wages. It highlights the links between job duration
a n da ni n s t i t u t i o nl i k eTFR. In particular, it helps understanding why we can identify the eﬀect of
severance payments at given tenure, wages and other characteristics. We make several simplifying
assumptions, whose bearings on the empirical analysis will be discussed in section 6.
that does not exceed 4% of the workforce". Indeed, it is not entirely clear whether early withdrawal after 8 years of
tenure is a workers’ right in ﬁrms with less than 25 employees. On the one hand, there is a high court ruling that
interprets the 4% threshold literally, and argues that ﬁrms with less than 25 employees are not obliged to obey to
the early withdrawal legislation. On the other hand, various judges argue that the early withdrawal request apply
as soon as "the cumulative yearly value of eligible workers does not reach 1” This implies that a ﬁrm of 5 employees
should agree to one advance withdrawal every 5 years.
4We consider a ﬁrm-worker pair that is engaged in a multi-period relationship that lasts T periods
and produces a value of pt at time t. In each period pt is drawn from a continuous distribution
F(x)=prob(p ≤ x) with ﬁnite upper support pmax. Firms and workers are risk neutral and
discount the future at the constant interest rate r. We do not model job creation, and we normalize
the outside option of the ﬁrm and the worker to zero. The key decision we are modelling is job
destruction conditional on the state of demand pt, and we give full authority to the ﬁrm in such
dimension. There are two possible ways in which a relationship ends. First, the ﬁrm decides to stop
production at time t. Second, the job survives up to time T. The most natural interpretation of T
is that of the retirement age, but it is also consistent with a temporary job. In this parsimonious
setup the worker is fairly passive, no quits are considered. We assume that the per period wage
is exogenously ﬁxed at w throughout the employment relationship; however, we discuss how the
results would change if wages were endogenous and ﬂexible (Appendix 9.1).
Our focus is on the deferred wage. We assume that in each period a fraction δ of the wage is
postponed and paid at the end of the employment relationship, regardless of the reasons behind
the job termination. Firms are obliged to accumulate the unpaid wages at rate ˜ r where ˜ r is
exogenously set. For most of our purposes, we consider the case in which r>˜ r, even though the
model is perfectly viable for a diﬀerent assumption. This is fully consistent with the data reported
in Table 1.
3.1 Value Functions
In what follows we indicate with Πt the expected present discounted value of a job at time t and
with Rt the value of accumulated unpaid past wages. The timing of the decision is as follows. At
the beginning of each period the ﬁrm decides whether continuing production is optimal. The ﬁrm
decision to continue production is based on the realization of the productivity shock. If production
takes place, part of the wages are paid and the relationship moves to the next period. If production
is interrupted, the entire stock of TFRis paid at the end of the period. For example, the sequence
of events for a job that lasts 2 periods is as follows. In the ﬁrst period, production takes place, and
the relationship moves to the second period where job destruction can take place. If it does, R2
is paid to the worker; if it does not, production takes place again and the job terminates when it
reaches its natural end at T =2 . In this case R3, the deferred wage, is paid to the worker.
We focus on (Πt|pt) which is the present discounted value of a ﬁrm who has just decided to










t =1 ...(T − 1)
pt − (1 − δ)wt − 1
1+rRt+1 t = T
(1)
5where the ﬁrm maximization decision over the job continuation is done in every period but the very
last one. In equation (1), the per period operational proﬁts are pt−(1−δ)wt while the continuation
value depends on whether job destruction is optimal. Note that if the job is destroyed TFRis still
to be paid. Note further that the deferred wage Rt+1 is paid to the worker regardless of the reason
behind the job termination, so that the payment Rt+1 is not a traditional severance payment. The
value of Rt evolves according to the following rule
Rt+1 =( 1+˜ r)[Rt + δwt] t =1 .....T,
with R1 =0 .





whose value will be determined below. While the problem is dynamic and non-stationary, since it
depends on the actual tenure of the worker, it can be easily solved by backward induction.




t=1 that solves equation 2.
Note that at time t =1 , in light of the deﬁnition of deferred wages, the reservation productivity
is akin to a job creation condition, and speciﬁes that a ﬁrm is willing to open a job as long as its
present discounted value is positive, or at least as large as the outside option of zero.
We also specify the worker’s value function, even though his role is fairly passive. This is
nevertheless useful for clearly specifying our assumptions. The present discounted value at time t














t =1 ...(T − 1)
(1 − δ)wt + 1
1+rRt+1 t = T
where it is clear that the worker takes as given the ﬁrm decision over the continuation policy, which
is described by the probability of separation F(p∗
t).
4 Characterizing The Model
4.1 One Period Model
To establish some very basic results we can start from a 1 period model (T =1 ), where the only
decision is a static reservation productivity, which is akin to a job creation decision. The ﬁrm proﬁt
6can be written as
Π|p = p − (1 − δ)w −
δw(1 + ˜ r)
1+r
Note that if wages are fully ﬂexible and proportional to the realization of productivity, so that
w = γp with γ<1, ﬁrm proﬁts are strictly proportional to productivity and can be written as
Π|p = p∆; w = γp






> 0 if ˜ r<r
In the one period model with ﬂexible wages the reservation productivity solves (Π|p∗)=0 , i.e.
p∗ =0 ,a n dt h eﬁrm job creation decision is p>0 independent of deferred wages. This implies
that mandatory deferred wages have no allocative impact. This feature should not be surprising,
since it is just an application of the Lazear (1990) neutrality result: any mandatory transfer from
the worker to the ﬁrm can be neutralized by wage ﬂexibility, i.e. deferred wages are irrelevant.6
Remark 2 With ﬂexible wages, deferred wages are irrelevant
To make the problem interesting, wages need to be not strictly proportional to productivity. An
extreme assumption is assuming that wages are ﬁxed and determined outside the relationship. As
Devicienti et al. (2006) show, in the case of Italy such assumption turns out to be not so extreme.
With constant wages, the reservation productivity reads
p∗ − w = −δw[
r − ˜ r
1+r
] (3)
Equation 3 highlights an important result. When wages are ﬁxed and ˜ r<r ,the ﬁrm has an
incentive to run a job with a marginal productivity that is lower than the wage. This mechanism
represents the basic channel for the labour hoarding eﬀect of deferred wages, a result that can be
much more appreciated with a proper dynamic setting.
4.2 Dynamic Setting
In this section we analytically solve the model with T =2 , so that the solution of the model is
described by the productivities p∗
1 and p∗
2. It turns out that most of the properties that we want to
emphasize apply to a two periods model.
6The neutrality result can also be seen in terms of total surplus of the job. The worker value function in the one
period model is
W|p =( 1− δ)w +
δw(1 + ˜ r)
1+r
and the total surplus from the job is S = W + Π = p which is positive as long as p>0
7We solve the model backward and obtain, sequentially, the reservation productivity at time
T =2and T =1 . The equations for the two productivities solve (Π2|p∗
2)=−R2 where R2 is the
stock of TFR at the beginning of period 2 and (Π1|p∗
1)=−R1, where R1 is the stock of TFR at
the beginning of the relationship at T =1 . Their respective values solve
p∗
2 − w = −Γ2(r, ˜ r,δw) (4)
p∗
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The sign of the two Γ f u n c t i o n si sp o s i t i v ea sl o n ga sr>˜ r,a na s s u m p t i o nt h a tw em a i n t a i n
throughout the work. The structure of the model, which is based on the assumption that the ﬁrm
has an outside opportunity of 0, implies that the ﬁrm has an option value associated to hiring
labour, even when deferred wages do not exist. To see this, one can solve the model when δ =0 ,
and obtain
p∗
2(δ=0) − w =0
p∗







where it is clear that p∗
1(δ =0 )<wso that at time t =1the ﬁrm is willing to run a current loss in
exchange of future proﬁtg a i n s . In the very last period, conversely, the problem is static and the
ﬁrm hires only if labour productivity is as large as the wage, exactly as in a static textbook model
of labor demand. As the next remark shows, we say that the ﬁrm hoards labour
Remark 3 With an outside option of zero and constant wages, the ﬁrm hoards labour in every
period but the very last one
Over and beyond the ﬁxed wage assumption, the ﬁrm propensity to hoard labour depends
also on the structure of the productivity shock. In our current setting shocks are i.i.d. and the
distribution faced by the ﬁrm is time invariant. If shocks were persistent and autoregressive, the
ﬁrm propensity to hoard would fall, since a fast and large turnaround would be less likely. For
analytical simplicity, we work only with i.i.d. shocks.
8One of the main questions of this paper is whether deferred wages increase the ﬁrm propensity
to hoard labour. To see this one needs to study the marginal impact of the deferred share δ on the
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1+r








where the latter expression was obtained after a simple substitution from equation (4). Equations
(6) and (7) are key equations, and show that the existence of TFR increases the ﬁrm propensity
to hoard labour. Note also that the result requires not only δ>0,b u ta l s or>˜ r. We can now
state one of our key results.
Remark 4 TFR increases the ﬁrm propensity to hoard labour. If ˜ r<r and δ>0, the reservation
productivity at time t falls with the size of TFR.
An intuition of this result is as follows. TFR creates on the part of the ﬁrm an incentive to
delay the time of separation, since the longer the average tenure, the lower the average labour cost.
Thus, following a negative temporary shocks, the ﬁrm optimally holds on to current losses just to
increase tenure and postpone the payment of the TFR.
While the presence of TFR unambiguously reduces the reservation productivity at time t,t h e
dynamic evolution of the reservation productivity for given TFR is more complicated, since there
are two labour hoarding eﬀects that inﬂuence the value of p∗
t and p∗
t+1. One the one hand, the
larger is t the larger is the accumulated stock of TFR, and the larger the ﬁrm incentive to hold
on to the worker; this reduces the reservation productivity. On the other hand, the larger is t the
lower is the future value of the ﬁrm rent. The net eﬀect of these two forces is thus ambiguous, and
one can not establish ex-ante the dynamic evolution of the productivity.
One can nevertheless establish that for a given forward looking time span, the labour hoarding
eﬀect of TFR increases with tenure. To see this we just consider two workers in the very last
period of the relationship (T =2in the context of our model) but with diﬀerent elapsed tenure.
Equation 4 describes a ﬁrm employing a worker with elapsed tenure τ =1 .S u p p o s e t h e ﬁrm






Γ2(r, ˜ r,δw)], where
ˆ
Γ2 = δwr−˜ r
1+r(1 + ˜ r)2 > 0 if ˜ r<r and δ>0, i.e. the wedge
between productivity and wages increases with elapsed tenure. It is straightforward to generalize
the result for a worker with elapsed tenure τ = K. In this case
_
p2 − w = −
_
Γ(r, ˜ r,δw,K) where





1+r[δw(1+ ˜ r)+δw(1+ ˜ r)
2 +δw(1+ ˜ r)
3]
9_




(1 + ˜ r)τ−1 > 0 if ˜ r<r and δ>0, increasing in K. As an example,
_
Γ(r, ˜ r,δw,K) relative to w c a nb ec o m p u t e ds e t t i n gδ =0 .074 (as stated by law), r =0 .12, ˜ r =0 .05,
based on average values from table 1.
_
Γ(r, ˜ r,δw,K) increases from 1% of w for K =1to 3.1% of
w for K =5to 6.6% of w for K =1 0 ; all but a negligible size.
Having characterized the ﬁrm reservation productivity, we can turn to the eﬀects of TFR on
ﬁrm proﬁts. To study such eﬀects, we can diﬀerentiate total expected proﬁts at the beginning of
the employment relationship with respect to δ. We can prove the following statement (see proof in
Appendix 9.2):
Remark 5 As long as δ>0 and ˜ r<rTFR increases ﬁrms’ present discounted proﬁts
The previous remark suggests that TFR, through its eﬀect on proﬁts, is likely to have an eﬀect
on job creation. Such eﬀect would arise in an equilibrium model of the labour market, which is
not within the scope of the current research. Models of this type have been extensively solved in
the literature. See notably for a survey Bertola (1999), Ljungqvist (2001) for the eﬀects of EPL
in a variety of models and Garibaldi and Violante (2005) for a paper that distinguishes between
various forms of EPL.
Turning to workers’ behaviour, we spell out the key theoretical assumption on workers’ behav-
iour:
We assume that for a given wage, workers enjoy the job security provisions determined by the
TFR.
Technically, this assumption is linked to the eﬀect of a larger TFRon workers’ welfare. As we
show in more details in appendix 9.3, the impact of larger TFRon workers welfare is made of two
components, which have opposite eﬀects, and we label them "income eﬀect" and "labour hoarding
eﬀect". The income eﬀect of TFR decreases workers’ welfare. A larger TFR (i.e. an increase in
the share δ of wages that are paid at the end of the relationship) induces a fall in workers’ utility,
since the worker is ﬁnancing the ﬁrm at the interest rate ˜ r and reduces the present discounted
value of its wage stream. The labour hoarding eﬀect of TFR increases workers’ welfare, since it
grants more stability to the worker. Our assumption implies that for a given wage and ﬁrm proﬁt
maximization behaviour, workers are better oﬀ with TFR. This is consistent with the evidence
that advance withdrawals are a rare event8.
8Average observed withdrawals among eligible workers (more than 8 years of tenure) working in large ﬁrms (above
25 employees) is about 6.5%; well below the maximum share stated by the law (10%).
104.3 The Eﬀects of Advance Withdrawals
In this section, in order to obtain a key empirical implication, we look into another institutional
dimension of the TFRlegislation, namely the possibility that TFRis paid in advance to the worker.
The last section explicitly assumed that, for given wages, workers enjoy the job security determined
by the TFR. This assumption implies that in the baseline model the individual is better oﬀ with
TFR,and if s/he had the option to withdraw the accumulated stock of TFRs/he would not exploit
such option. Hence, since TFRis welfare improving at the given wage, an advance withdrawal has
to be the result of an exogenous and random shock. We assume that such shock takes place at
an exogenous rate μ. The interpretation we give to the shock μ is an i.i.d. liquidity shock at the
individual level.
The advance withdrawal has an impact on ﬁrm behaviour. The existence of the withdrawing
shock modiﬁes the sequence of events within the model. At the beginning of the period a with-
drawing shock is realized. Then the ﬁrm observes the realization of the productivity shock. If the
worker did withdraw from his stock of TFR (at rate μ),t h eﬁrm continues operation as long as
p2 > ˜ p∗
2. In case there is a ﬁrm initiated separation (i.e. p is below the threshold ˜ p∗
2),n oTFR is
due9. If the worker did not withdraw from his stock of TFR (at rate 1 − μ),t h eﬁrm continues
operation as long as p>p ∗
2. In case there is a ﬁrm initiated separation (i.e. p is below the threshold
p∗),t h ef u l lTFR is due.
Clearly, the value of the continuation proﬁt depends on whether an advance withdrawal shock
hits the relationship. As the analysis in the appendix 9.4 makes clear, the value function for Πt(pt)
speciﬁes a diﬀerent reservation productivity conditional on the fact that a withdrawal will or will
not take place. Characterizing the two reservation productivities p∗
2 and ˜ p∗
2 in the context of our




The previous expression implies that when a worker withdraws its TFR,t h eﬁrm reduces its
incentive to hold to marginal losses. The following empirical implication follows.
• EMPIRICAL IMPLICATION. Other things equal, workers who withdraw their TFR,
have a larger probability of experiencing a separation.
Since in the model there are no quits, the separation is ﬁrm initiated. The intuition of the
empirical implication is straightforward. Conditional on an advance withdrawal, the ﬁrm incentive
9For the sake of simplicity, we impose that 100% of the stock of TFRis withdrawn. The law imposes a maximum
withdrawal of 70%; in the actual data the median share is about 60%.
11to hold on to marginal losses disappears, and the labour hoarding dimension of TFR is no longer
relevant. As a consequence, for given tenure, the ﬁrm will prefer to hold on to those individuals
that did not experience an advance withdrawal.
The empirical implication highlighted above is the key prediction that we take to the data in
the rest of the work. Before introducing the empirical analysis we present the dataset available to
us, and some descriptive statistics
5 Data and descriptive statistics
We have access to a single-spell ﬂow-sample of Italian employment spells. The data source is the
Work Histories Italian Panel (WHIP) originated from the Italian Social Security Administration
(INPS) archives and processed in a public-use ﬁle by LABORatorio Revelli. We have a 1:90 random
sample of the entire archive of employees of private ﬁrms for the period 1985 to 1999. This is
a longitudinal archive, as the same worker can be followed over time through possibly diﬀerent
employers. From such sample we select all employees that start a new job between February
1985 and December 198810 and we follow those particular employment spells till they end or until
December 1999. Ongoing spells at December 1999 are right censored11. Notice that, in principle
we can observe more than one employment spell for the same worker. However, as we need "long"
spells to observe advance withdrawals, and as the observation period lasts between 11 and 14 years
this possibility is actually unavailable. Finally, we select spells that last a minimum of four years, to
be able to condition on lagged covariates (about 20,000 spells). This unavoidable selection excludes
from the analysis very short employment spells, scarcely relevant for the purpose of the work. On
the other hand, this selection turns out to be very important for the robustness checks on reverse
causality discussed in section 6.312.
We observe the workers once a year, even though we know the exact month in which the hire
and the (possible) separation took place. Starting time and censoring are clearly exogenous.
An important empirical remark concerns the cause of ﬁrm-worker separation. In the data there
are three possible causes of separation: natural turnover (reaching the retirement age T13), worker
initiated separation (quit), ﬁrm initiated separation. We are interested in ﬁrm initiated separations
10For those working in January 1985 we cannot distinguish between new hirings and left censored ongoing employ-
ment spells.
11For those working in December 1999 we cannot distinguish between separations occurring in December and right
censored ongoing employment spells. This generates an - unavoidable - underestimation of the separation rate in
1999.
12The point is discussed further in section 6.3.
13There are no temporary contracts in our sample. In the years 1985-1989 temporary contracts could last a
maximum of 2 years; hence imposing a minimum tenure of 4 years selects either permanent contract workers or
workers hired with a temporary contract subsequently transformed into a permanent one.
12only. However, our dataset reports separations but not their cause. Empirically, we distinguish
between diﬀerent causes of separation in the following way. First, we are very conservative vis-à-vis
the quit for retirement, and we deﬁne "retirements" all separations that occur when the worker is
55 or over. More subtle and problematic is how to disentangle quits and layoﬀs. There is a well
known grey area between worker initiated and ﬁrm initiated separations, both from a theoretical
and from an empirical point of view. We address the issue using the observed duration of the
subsequent non-employment spell; the idea being that on average a quit is "more likely" to lead
t oan e wj o b" s o o n e r "t h a nal a y o ﬀ. Hence, we label "ﬁrm initiated separation" those separations
followed by a spell of non-employment of at least two months. Of course what we obtain is to
increase the share of ﬁrm initiated separations, not to exclude quits altogether. In Appendix 9.5
we discuss the robustness of the econometric results to this deﬁnition of ﬁrm initiated separation.
We now turn to some descriptive statistics on TFR and advance withdrawals. The WHIP
archive records the TFR stock at December of year t. It is then possible to compute the rate of
accumulation of TFRwith respect to the total annual gross wage. Figure 1 shows its distribution.
There is some variability around the 1/13.5=0.074 coeﬃcient stated by the law. This is likely to
reﬂect a number of unobservable events that may be the outcome of union - ﬁrms agreements with
respect to the "relevant part of the wage" mentioned by the law on which the TFRyearly increase
is computed. However, there is also some variability that cannot easily be explained (e.g. small
positive and negative values, clearly visible in Figure 1), and we label it "measurement error". The
existence of measurement error imposes a more precise deﬁnition of "withdrawal", since "negative
changes in TFRstock" would overestimate the event of interest. In the rest of the work, we deﬁne
a withdrawal as a negative change in the stock of TFRbetween t−1 and t that (i) does not occur
in the separation year (it would be the compulsory payment, not a withdrawal); (ii) involves at
least 20% of the existing TFR stock; (iii) amounts at least at 500 euro in real terms. Sensitivity
analysis conﬁrms that the - necessarily arbitrary - choice of the above mentioned thresholds is non
inﬂuential on the econometric estimates.
As we mention in Section 2, withdrawing from the stock of TFR is a legal right of the worker
only under speciﬁc circumstances: eight years of tenure are elapsed, a few causes are met (health,
housing, leave for training), ﬁrms are larger than 25 employees (even though among law scholars
there is no agreement over whether such constraint binds) and less than 10 percent of the workforce
applies for an advance withdrawal. As a results, it should not be surprising that the total number
of advance withdrawals observed is not large, and it concerns less than 2 percent of the entire
ﬁrm-worker pairs we observe (table 2). The share of advance withdrawals from the stock of TFR
increases with tenure, and reaches some 6% of the workforce having 12 years of tenure. This very
13low share is consistent with our hypothesis that workers value the labour hoarding eﬀect of TFR
and normally do not withdraw, even if they could. Information on the mean and median shares
of advance withdrawals suggests that workers go for a large share of the TFR (about 60%). Such
amount is quantitatively relevant. Since the TFR stock increases approximately by one month of
salary for every year of tenure, withdrawing 60% of the stock at the 10th year of tenure is equivalent
to receiving about half of the yearly salary.
Withdrawals before tenure 8 are by deﬁnition consensual. Since an early withdrawal tends
to reduce proﬁts, we believe that ﬁrms authorize such advance withdrawals only if business con-
ditions are good (a sort of informal proﬁt sharing agreement on this speciﬁc aspect only), while
advance withdrawals are denied if business conditions are less favorable. While we do not observe
ﬁrms’ proﬁt ,T a b l e2s h o w st h a tu pt ot e n u r e8a d v a n c ew i t h d r a w a l sa r ec o n s t a n t l ym o r el i k e l y
in growing ﬁrms than in shrinking ﬁrms. The opposite becomes true after the 8th year of tenure,
when withdrawals may be non consensual. Although not a formal test, this is consistent with our
interpretation.
Table 2: Characteristics of advance withdrawals.
elapsed total percentage percentage percentage mean median
tenure number of employees in growing ﬁrms in shrinking ﬁrms withdrawal withdrawal
(years) (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
1 39 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.82 0.98
2 136 0.39 0.51 0.44 0.82 0.97
3 213 0.81 0.85 0.96 0.71 0.71
4 268 1.31 1.42 1.21 0.64 0.60
5 243 1.46 1.67 1.28 0.63 0.62
6 264 1.90 1.83 1.74 0.63 0.58
7 319 2.64 2.97 2.3 0.62 0.59
8 439 4.14 5.12 4.05 0.59 0.57
9 546 5.83 5.94 7.14 0.57 0.57
10 454 5.46 5.99 6.23 0.58 0.58
11 397 5.38 5.26 6.89 0.58 0.59
12 283 6.19 5.99 8.13 0.58 0.60
13 129 5.14 6.9 4.91 0.61 0.61
14 50 4.96 0.57 0.60
Total 3,780 1.59
(a) Absolute number of withdrawals observed in the sample
(b) Pct. of withdrawers over total no. of employees, for given tenure
(c) Pct. of withdrawers over total no. of employees in growing ﬁrms, for given tenure
(d) Pct. of withdrawers over total no. of employees in shrinking ﬁrms, for given tenure
(e) Mean computed on positive withdrawals only
(f) Median of positive withdrawals only
Table 3 compares the sample composition at tenure 10 for the entire sample of those who
survived in the job for at least 10 years and for those individuals among them that experienced
an advance withdrawal at tenure 9. Individuals that experience an advance withdrawal are more
14likely to be males, in the mid thirties, non-manual workers, employed in larger ﬁrms (median ﬁrm
size is 100 workers instead of about 50). We will discuss the link between ﬁrm size and withdrawals
presenting the results.
Table 3: Sample composition at tenure=10 years.
all workers withdrawers at
at tenure=10 tenure=9 only
(a) (b)
daily real wage (c) median 67 74
ﬁrm size median 48 103
age at entry median 25 24
manual % 0.569 0.533
female % 0.333 0.267
part time % 0.063 0.038
geograﬁcm o v e r % 0.289 0.300
industry= utilities % 0.023 0.026
industry= chemical etc. % 0.073 0.097
industry= mechanical % 0.239 0.239
industry= textile, food etc. % 0.236 0.200
industry= construction % 0.064 0.072
industry= wholesale, retail % 0.180 0.127
industry= transports % 0.061 0.139
industry= banking, insurances % 0.124 0.101
Observations no. 8320 546
(a) Characteristics of all workers at 10 years of tenure
(a) Characteristics of workers at 10 years of tenure that withdrew at tenure=9 years
(c) Euro. (,000 lire in the estimates)
6 Empirical Analysis and Econometric Strategy
In this section we ﬁrst present the basic empirical model; then we turn to other important empirical
issues, namely unobserved heterogeneity and reverse causality.
6.1 The Basic Empirical Model
We highlight once more the key empirical implication that stemmed from our theoretical model:
other things equal, workers that withdraw increase the probability of ﬁrm initiated separation.
Empirically, we exploit the variability the withdrawal generates in the TFRstocks for given wage
and tenure; such variability can be used to test our hypothesis. In words, we set a test to compare
the probability of observing a ﬁrm initiated separation, at a given tenure and wage, for workers
that did not withdraw their TFR stock and for workers who did. The natural setting for testing
this empirical implication is the use of survivals models (Lancaster, 1990, Wooldridge, 2002). We
estimate
h(t;D,X)=f(t;D,X)/[1 − F(t;D,X)] (8)
15where h(t;D,X) is the hazard rate, i.e. the probability of ending the employment spell between t
and t+1conditional on having "survived" on the job up to t, or the ratio between the density f()
and its cumulative function 1 − F(), or survival function. It is expressed as a function of elapsed
tenure t,o fa ne v e n t u a lw i t h d r a w a lD, and of a set of characteristics X including the wage.
Remark 6 T h eg o a lo fo u re m p i r i c a le x e r c i s ei st ot e s tw h e t h e rt h ei m p a c to fD on h is positive,
i.e. whether the probability of a ﬁrm initiated separation between t and t +1 , conditional on an
elapsed tenure t, is increased by withdrawing from TFR.
Before discussing how to bring the theoretical model - and its simplifying assumptions - to the
data, we present the econometric setup.
The job termination process is a continuous time process, even though we describe it in discrete
time in our theoretical model for analytical simplicity. The empirical approach to the problem
should take into account such property, even though we work with discrete time data. Our speci-
ﬁcation of the hazard does take care of this issue. Assuming that the continuous time process can
be speciﬁed as a proportional hazard model, one has:
h(t;D,X)=κ(D,X)h0(t) (9)
where κ is a non-negative function of the covariates and h0(t) is the baseline hazard. The important
assumption here is that the process is separable in X,D and t, i.e. that the baseline hazard is the
same for all individuals and it shifts due to the eﬀect of the covariates. This is a very convenient
assumption because odds ratios are then constant for every X. If we assume - as it is standard in
the literature - that κ(D,X) is an exponential function, the hazard reads
h(t;D,X)=e x p ( Xα+ βD)h0(t)
The speciﬁcation of h0(t) can be parametric or non parametric. The most ﬂexible option is to use
a set of dummies on each t;w ec h o o s ei tt om i t i g a t ea sm u c ha sp o s s i b l et h ee ﬀect of unobserved
heterogeneity on the estimates14. Notice that the coeﬃcients α,β are semi-elasticities of the hazard
with respect to the covariates.
Prentice and Gloeckler (1978) and Jenkins (1995) show that the discrete time counterpart of an
underlying continuous time proportional hazard model is a complementary log-log function. This
means that under the hypothesis that the true process in continuous time is the above one, and
under the hypothesis that the econometrician observes the process only at discrete points in time,
the resulting hazard is the following:
14More on this point below.
16h(t;D,X)=1− exp{−exp[h0(t)+Xα+βD]}
so that taking logs
log[−log(1 − h(t;D,X)] = h0(t)+Xα+ βD (10)
In light of the proportional hazard speciﬁcation of the underlying continuous process, obtaining




=e x p [ β(d − 0)]
w h e r ew ec o m p u t et h er e l a t i v ei n c r e a s ei nt h ei n s t a n t a n e o u sh a z a r dd u et oD being equal to d with
respect to D being equal to the baseline case 0 (no withdrawal).
6.2 Unobserved Heterogeneity
In the model individuals are ex-ante identical. In the empirical analysis we include a set of controls
X for observable worker and ﬁrm speciﬁc characteristics. However, equation (10) does not allow
for unobserved heterogeneity. If unobserved heterogeneity is important, omitting it implies (i) a
downward biased estimated duration dependence, (ii) a downward bias on the (absolute value of
the) estimated parameters α and β, (iii) that the downward bias on the (absolute value of the)
estimated parameters α and β increases with t15. It must be stated up-front that the eﬀects
of unobserved heterogeneity are mitigated by the use of a ﬂexible speciﬁcation of the baseline
hazard (see Jenkins, 2005). This is the reason why we choose a non parametric and totally ﬂexible
speciﬁcation for h0(t), i.e. a set of dummies on each t. Furthermore, the eﬀects of non including
unobserved heterogeneity work against the empirical implication we aim at testing, so that if we
obtain a signiﬁcant and positive β w em a yh a v eal o w e rb o u n do ft h et r u ea n dl a r g e re ﬀect of a
withdrawal on the hazard rate16. Nevertheless, we estimate equation (10) also including unobserved
heterogeneity, as a robustness check. We assume that unobserved heterogeneity is uncorrelated to
observables and we estimate a random intercept model. Data limitation forbids to model general
correlation between unobserved heterogeneity and the (time invariant as well as time varying)
15It can be shown that [1−F(t,D,X|v)] = S(t,D,X|v)=[ S(t,D,X)]
v, i.e. unobserved heterogeneity v,o rf r a i l t y ,
scales the no-frailty component survival function (see Jenkins, 2005). It means that high-v individuals leave the job
faster than low-v individuals, changing the sample composition over time and generating the eﬀects mentioned in
text when omitted from the model.
16An intuition could be the following. Workers with low (unobserved) propensity to change jobs will stay longer
and therefore be more likely to withdraw, making it harder to obtain a positive eﬀect of withdrawal on separation.We
thank an anonimous referee for this comment.
17covariates17.D e ﬁning v as a positive random variable with unit mean and ﬁnite variance σ2,
distributed independently of t,X,D, equation (9) becomes
h(t;D,X,v)=κ(D,X)h0(t)v (11)
and equation (10) becomes
log[−log(1 − h(t;D,X,v)] = h0(t)+Xα+ βD+ v (12)
To estimate equation (12) we must specify the distribution of v. Two options are available: a
parametric and a non parametric one. In the ﬁrst case the most common choice is the Gamma
distribution, that can be easily integrated out of equation (12) providing a closed form of the uncon-
ditional hazard. The non parametric approach applies Heckman and Singer (1984) seminal work,
ﬁtting an arbitrary discrete distribution whose parameters are its mass points and the probabilities
that individuals belong to one of them. To be more speciﬁc :s u p p o s ew eh a v et w om a s sp o i n t s ,i . e .
two kinds of individuals; equation (12) becomes
log[−log(1 − h1(t;D,X,v1)] = h0(t)+Xα+ βD+ v1 (13)
log[−log(1 − h2(t;D,X,v2)] = h0(t)+Xα+ βD+ v2 (14)
and the contribution of each individual to the estimate will be the probability-weighted average of
the two above hazards.
In terms of our model, a parametric Gamma distribution for v implies that every individual is
diﬀerent from the others depending on a random draw from that distribution. A non parametric
discrete distribution implies that we have n groups of individuals, that every individual is identical
to the other members of his group and diﬀerent from members of other groups; it also implies
that each person is allocated randomly to a group. We apply both assumptions; however the non
parametric one is more ﬂexible and it could have a more straightforward interpretation in terms
of our model. If n =2we could label the groups "good health" and "poor health" people, or
"shirkers" and "non shirkers", or "movers" and "stayers", and so on18.
17Horowitz and Lee (2004) provide a consistent estimator for survival models with unobserved heterogeneity pos-
sibly correlated to observables. Such estimator requires data with repeated spells for each individual. As already
anticipated, such dataset is not currently available for the speciﬁc purpose of this analysis.
18The obvious limitation of both approaches is the randomness of v. As already stated, the only way of relaxing
this assumption is to have access to a repeated spells sample.
186.3 Reverse Causality and Other Issues
The theoretical model excludes quits and imposes exogenous withdrawals. Our empirical strategy
encompasses these two assumptions. In the real world, with endogenous quits, it may well be
possible that individuals ﬁrst decide to leave their current job, and subsequently withdraw from
their accumulated stock of TFR. In other words, there may be a reverse causality eﬀect, in the
sense that an anticipated separation is followed by an advance withdrawal of the TFR stock and
then by the separation itself. Clearly, individuals that are certain to leave their current job are only
interested in the income eﬀect of TFRand the job security eﬀect vanishes. However, the possibility
of reverse causality can be fairly easily ruled out by introducing lags between the withdrawal and the
observed separation. We introduce up to three lags, regarding as totally unrealistic the hypothesis
that workers can plan to quit 24 to 36 months in advance. This makes it necessary the selection
of employment spells that last a minimum of four years. The drawback is limited. Short spells
provide little information to our analysis: accumulated TFR stock is very low, advance withdrawals
are extremely rare; hence, variability in TFR stock at given wage and tenure is very limited. There
is a clear trade oﬀ between higher order lags and sample selection. Three lags proved to be the
best compromise.
Finally, we assume that the per period wage is exogenously ﬁxed at w throughout the employ-
ment relationship. This is certainly a reasonable assumption at the individual level in Italy, since
most of the wages are negotiated at the industry or national level19; individual wage cuts below
the collectively set wage are hardly possible20.
7R e s u l t s
7.1 Unconditional Hazard
We begin by providing simple statistics on the hazard rate conditional on a withdrawal having or
not occurred at t − 3. We choose the longest lag to avoid any reverse causality problem. These
hazard rates are estimated non parametrically, using the Kaplan-Meier estimator of the probability




19Only about 10% of the total wage is bargained at the individual level, on average (Devicienti et al., 2006).
20Notice that this does not deny the ﬁrm the possibility to consent to an advance withdrawal if the worker is hit
by an adverse liquidity shock when s/he has no right to access the TFR fund. This consent makes the wage neither
endogenous nor downward ﬂexible.
19where m(t) is the number of spells terminated between t and t +1and n(t) is the number of
ongoing spells at t.W e c o m p u t e h(t) separately for individuals that have withdrawn at t − 3
and for individuals that have not. Figure 2 plots h(t) for t =5to 14. Remarkably, the hazard
rate conditional on advance withdrawals having occurred lies clearly above the hazard rate for
individuals that did not withdraw three years before. Such diﬀerence is very large up to tenure 11,
while the gap closes for longer tenures. While this pattern may look puzzling, it is actually linked
to ﬁrm size. Figure 3 shows that beyond tenure 7 the median ﬁrm size of workers that withdraw
their stock of TFRis twice as large the average ﬁrm size at that particular tenure. In other words,
the additional withdrawals after tenure 7 take place in large ﬁrms. Not surprisingly, if we replicate
Figure 2 selecting only ﬁrms in the ﬁrst quintile of the size distribution (by elapsed tenure) the
puzzle disappears (Figure 4). This discussion suggests that ﬁrm size is an important determinant
of the individual probability of withdrawing, as we further discuss in the multivariate analysis that
follows (it will conﬁrm that, excluding composition eﬀects, a non consensual withdrawal is more
likely to increase the hazard of ﬁrm initiated separation).
7.2 Empirical Speciﬁcation
The regressor of interest can be speciﬁed in diﬀerent ways. The straightforward one is to use
the dummy D to signal that an advance withdrawal has taken place. However, there are better
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0 if D(t)=0
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ln|TFRt − TFRt−1| if D(t)=1
0 if D(t)=0
The advantage of using TFRdrawR or TFRdrawA i n s t e a do ft h ei n d i c a t o rD is clear: we
allow for larger withdrawals to have a more sizeable eﬀect on the hazard. The advantage of us-
ing TFRdrawR with respect to TFRdrawA is in the ease to interpret its estimated coeﬃcient.
However, as we will see, all deﬁnitions provide coherent estimated results, as a further proof of
robustness.
As anticipated, the advance withdrawal regressor always enters the analysis as a lagged value.
This is coherent with our theoretical setting, where we show that the realization of a withdrawal
leads to a subsequent increase in the probability of separation. The risk of reverse causality in
the relationship between advance withdrawal and subsequent job separation is present when the
20time lag between the two events is suﬃciently short. Such risk, conversely, is not present when
the time lag between the two events is large. So we include three lags in the regressor of interest,
acknowledging that lag 1 might be aﬀected by a reverse causality bias, but not higher order lags.
As a robustness check we also estimate the model excluding lag 1 and lag 2 from the speciﬁcation,
providing further evidence on the direct eﬀect of an advance withdrawal on the probability of
separation.
Our speciﬁcation includes time varying as well as time invariant controls, detailed in Table 4.
h0(t) is speciﬁed as a set of dummy variables on t. Available time invariant characteristics are
individual’s gender, age at entry, occupation, type of contract(full or part time), whether s/he
works in a province diﬀerent from where s/he was born, and ﬁrm’s industry. Among time varying
covariates, observed once a year, we have daily average real wage (at 2003 prices, 000 lire) and ﬁrm
size (the number of employees); both enter the speciﬁcation in logs and lagged one period. Two
covariates deserve a special remark. We have a dummy for growing and a dummy for shrinking
ﬁrms, deﬁned as positive (negative) yearly changes in the stock of employees (lagged one period).
They aim at controlling for ﬁrms’ proﬁtability in general terms, as separation rates should naturally
be diﬀerent in expanding and contracting ﬁrms.
7.3 Bottom-line Results
The bottom-line results of our multivariate analysis (equation 10) are speciﬁed in table 4. Estimated
standard errors are robust to heteroschedasticity. Duration dependence is negative, as expected,
but not smooth, supporting the choice of a ﬂexible speciﬁcation. Lagged wages and ﬁrm size have
both the expected negative impact on the hazard, while the manual occupation dummy, as well
as the part time and female ones feature the expected positive sign. Age at entry has a positive
impact on the hazard of separation up to 27 years, then negative. As expected, having reduced the
workforce at the ﬁrm level in the past has a positive impact on the hazard while having increased
it does not impact the hazard diﬀerently from having had a constant employment level.
The main empirical result concerns the sign and signiﬁcance of the advance withdrawals, that are
indicated in the table as "withdrawal at t-j”. Remarkably, withdrawal at t−1 and withdrawal at
t−3 are positive and signiﬁcant, while it does not appear signiﬁcant at lag 221.T h i si ss ow h a t e v e r
the deﬁnition of withdrawal (share, log of absolute value, dummy on the event), as reported in table
5, speciﬁcation A22. Quantitatively, the result is also sizeable. Taking at face value the coeﬃcient
21We must remember that we are dealing with a few cases of advance withdrawal, so that statistical signiﬁcance
cannot always be achieved.
22Only the coeﬃcients of interest are reported. Coeﬃcients on controls are unchanged with respect to table 4 and
are not reported.
21Table 4: Hazard rate estimate. Baseline speciﬁcation.
β s.e. p value
withdrawal at t-1 0.332 0.101 0.001
withdrawal at t-2 -0.010 0.130 0.937
withdrawal at t-3 0.274 0.131 0.036
elapsed tenure=4
elapsed tenure=5 -0.043 0.036 0.230
elapsed tenure=6 -0.231 0.040 0
elapsed tenure=7 -0.266 0.043 0
elapsed tenure=8 -0.306 0.046 0
elapsed tenure=9 -0.270 0.049 0
elapsed tenure=10 -0.185 0.050 0
elapsed tenure=11 -0.338 0.056 0
elapsed tenure=12 -0.237 0.067 0
elapsed tenure=13 -0.362 0.093 0
elapsed tenure=14 -0.830 0.179 0
log real daily wage at t-1 -0.423 0.042 0
log ﬁrm size at t-1 -0.129 0.008 0
dummy growing ﬁrm at t-1 0.008 0.035 0.828
dummy shrinking ﬁrm at t-1 0.346 0.031 0
dummy part time 0.347 0.049 0
dummy female 0.095 0.029 0.001
age at entry -0.219 0.010 0
age at entry squared/100 0.388 0.016 0
dummy manual occupation 0.106 0.030 0.001
dummy geographic mover 0.021 0.027 0.441
industry= utilities -1.538 0.226 0
industry= chemical etc. -0.355 0.059 0
industry= mechanical -0.428 0.044 0
industry= textile, food etc. -0.323 0.043 0
industry= construction
industry= wholesale, retail -0.254 0.044 0
industry= transports -0.588 0.075 0
industry= banking, insurances -0.498 0.057 0





no. Sep. and withdraw at t-1 226
no. Sep. and withdraw at t-2 141
no. Sep. and withdraw at t-3 130
Probability of ﬁrm initiated separation.
Complementary log log model. Robust s.e.
Withdrawal is deﬁned as withdrawal rate.
22Table 5: Hazard rate estimate. Robustness to deﬁnition of withdrawal and to reverse causality.
Speciﬁcation A Speciﬁcation B
β s.e. p value β s.e. p value
1. withdrawal rate
withdrawal at t-1 0.332 0.101 0.001
withdrawal at t-2 -0.010 0.130 0.937
withdrawal at t-3 0.274 0.131 0.036 0.276 0.131 0.035
2. log absolute withdrawal
withdrawal at t-1 0.015 0.008 0.052
withdrawal at t-2 -0.008 0.010 0.454
withdrawal at t-3 0.021 0.011 0.046 0.021 0.011 0.044
3. withdrawal dummy
withdrawal at t-1 0.128 0.069 0.063
withdrawal at t-2 -0.067 0.086 0.438
withdrawal at t-3 0.176 0.090 0.051 0.179 0.090 0.048
Probability of ﬁrm initiated separation.
Complementary log log model. Robust s.e.
Coeﬃ cients of interest only. Controls as in baseline speciﬁcation, not reported
Speciﬁcation A - baseline speciﬁcation
Speciﬁcation B - robustness to reverse causality (lag 3 only)
on lag 3 in the ﬁrst model (share of withdrawal), in Figure 5 we draw the instantaneous odds ratio
of withdrawing a given share of TFR relative to not withdrawing, along with the 95% conﬁdence
interval. The implied increase in the instantaneous hazard is not negligible. An individual that
withdraws 60% of the fund increases the instantaneous hazard rate by some 17-18% three years
later. In other words, an individual with at least 10 years of tenure that withdraws the TFRfund
increases his hazard rate from 10% to about 12% three years later.
7.4 Extensions and Robustness
The ﬁrst key robustness test refers to unobserved heterogeneity. Working on our bottom line
speciﬁcation, we introduce unobserved heterogeneity both Gamma distributed and non parametric
(with 2 mass points). Table 6 shows that, although signiﬁcant, unobserved heterogeneity has a
negligible eﬀect on the parameters of interest23. Hence we are conﬁdent in presenting estimates
that impose no unobserved heterogeneity.
Table 5 speciﬁcation B presents the second key robustness test. In order to fully avoid the
risk of reverse causality, we disregard all advance withdrawals that take place in the 24 months
before the actual separation date, since such advance withdrawals may capture the reverse causality
mechanism. An advance withdrawal that takes place 3 years before the separation date features a
positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient.
We now turn to the eﬀect of ﬁrm size on the hazard of job termination. As we pointed out in
23It has a negligible eﬀect also on the other controls, not reported.
23Table 6: Hazard rate estimate. Robustness to unobserved heterogeneity.
β s.e. p value
1. unobserved heterogeneity: no
withdrawal at t-1 0.3324 0.101 0.001
withdrawal at t-2 -0.0104 0.130 0.937
withdrawal at t-3 0.2741 0.131 0.036
2. unobserved heterogeneity: gamma
withdrawal at t-1 0.3317 0.100 0.001
withdrawal at t-2 -0.0111 0.128 0.931
withdrawal at t-3 0.2744 0.133 0.039
Gamma var. 0.207 0.113 0.068
LR test of gamma var =0: chibar2(01)= 3.589 0.029
3. unobserved heterogeneity: discrete, 2 m.p.
withdrawal at t-1 0.3342 0.102 0.001
withdrawal at t-2 -0.0057 0.130 0.965
withdrawal at t-3 0.2753 0.135 0.041
v1 0.000
v2 2.066 0.221 0.000
prob. Type 1 0.911 0.027 0.000
prob. Type 2 0.089 0.027 0.001
Probability of ﬁrm initiated separation.
Complementary log log model. Robust s.e.
Coeﬃ cients of interest only. Controls as in baseline speciﬁcation, not reported
Withdrawal is deﬁned as withdrawal rate.
section 2, there is a discontinuity over the ﬁrm size distribution in the application of the legislation
on TFR,n a m e l yﬁrms below 25 employees seem to be exempted from the obligation to allow
withdrawals from the fund. This implies that in these ﬁrms withdrawals should be consensual,
whatever the elapsed tenure, and hence they should be less harmful for the career of those who
withdraw. As Table 2 conﬁrms, the small number of observed withdrawals does not allow us to
perform a proper Regression Discontinuity Design; however, we can interact the rate of withdrawal
at t−324 with ﬁrm size at t−3 (above or below 25 employees). Notice that this does not mean that
we have only consensual withdrawals in small ﬁrms and only non consensual withdrawals in larger
ﬁrms. In the ﬁrst case, the jurisprudence is not unanimous in interpreting the law with respect to
ﬁrms below 25 employees25; in the second case, consensual withdrawals can take place before the
8th year of tenure and even afterward (when parameters set by the law are exceeded). What we
can achieve is to increase the share of non consensual withdrawals when focussing on ﬁrms above
25 employees. Table 7 reports the coeﬃcients of interest26. Although less precisely estimated, we
learn that the average estimated coeﬃcient of .27 increases to .34 among large ﬁrms and decreases
to .22, not signiﬁcant, among small ﬁrms. This is what we expected. This also sheds some light on
24Changing the deﬁnition of the regressor does not change the results.
25S e ef o o t n o t e4 .
26Again, coeﬃcients on controls are unchanged and not reported.
24Table 7: Hazard rate estimate. Interaction with ﬁrm size.
β s.e. p value
withdrawal at t-1 0.332 0.101 0.001
withdrawal at t-2 -0.010 0.130 0.936
withdrawal at t-3 in ﬁrms below 25 employees 0.222 0.174 0.201
withdrawal at t-3 in ﬁrms above 25 employees 0.341 0.196 0.082
Probability of ﬁrm initiated separation.
Complementary log log model. Robust s.e.
Coeﬃ cients of interest only. Controls as in baseline speciﬁcation, not reported
Withdrawal is deﬁned as withdrawal rate.
the pattern by size of the Kaplan-Meyer estimator of the unconditional hazard we discussed at the
beginning of the section. Excluding composition eﬀects conﬁrms that a non consensual withdrawal
is more likely to increase the hazard of ﬁrm initiated separation.
The legislation introduces also a discontinuity over the elapsed tenure dimension (before or after
the 8th year). Again, a Regression Discontinuity Design is beyond the possibility of the available
data. Related to this is the estimated pattern of the duration dependence, that seems to show a
slowdown in the hazard at year 8 or 9 (Table 4). Abbring and Van Der Berg (2003) propose an
estimator that would account for a possible interaction between D and t in the data; however, that
estimator is identiﬁed only if the "no anticipation" assumption is acceptable. If reverse causality is
a ni s s u ei no u rm o d e l ,a n dw es ob e l i e v e ,t h a nt h ee s t i m a t o ri sn o ti d e n t i ﬁed.27. Nevertheless, from a
pure econometric point of view, unobserved heterogeneity, misspeciﬁcation and heteroschedasticity
are indistinguishable, and our very ﬂexible baseline hazard is meant to capture not only unobserved
heterogeneity but also eventual missing interactions between t a n dt h ec o v a r i a t e s .I no u rb a s e l i n e
speciﬁcation we estimate the residual average eﬀect of a withdrawal on the hazard, getting possibly
al o w e rb o u n de s t i m a t eo ft h et r u ee ﬀect.
Finally, in Appendix 9.5 we check the eﬀect of our deﬁnition of ﬁrm initiated separation, as well
as the eﬀect of sample selection with respect to the inclusion or exclusion of workers separating
because of retirement or quit.
O v e r a l la l lo u rr e s u l t sp o i n tc o n s i s t e n t l yi nf a v o u ro ft h eE m p i r i c a lI m p l i c a t i o no fo u rt h e o r e t i c a l
model: other things equal, workers that withdraw from their stock of TFRincrease the probability
of a ﬁrm initiated separation.
8 Conclusions
This paper has studied the severance payment dimension of a mandatory deferred wage payment
(TFR) of the Italian labour market. Theoretically, deferred wages increase labor hoarding from
27We thank an anonymous referee for bringing this work to our attention.
25the ﬁrm standpoint if two conditions hold: wages are rigid, and deferred wages are accumulated at
interest rates that are below market rates. Indeed, if wages were fully ﬂexible, the problem would
not even arise, since deferred wages would be completely irrelevant from the allocative standpoint.
The second condition ensures that the longer the tenure, the lower the average wage cost. As long
as both conditions are satisﬁed, as it certainly seems to be the case for Italy, ﬁrms hoard labour in
bad times, holding on to marginal loss as a way to increase the average duration of jobs and hence
decrease average labour cost.
Empirically, the paper shows that individuals with larger severance payments (in the form of
larger TFR credit) at given tenure and wage, have lower hazard rates of job termination. Speciﬁ-
cally, we have used information on about 20,000 employment spells to test a key empirical implica-
tion: workers who withdraw their accumulated stock of unpaid wages in advance, have a subsequent
increase in the probability of begin ﬁred. This prediction seems to be empirically robust and quan-
titatively sizeable. A withdrawal of 60% of the TFR stock increases the instantaneous hazard rate
of job termination by some 20%.
Our results are also relevant in the policy debate, which has always analyzed the impact of
deferred wage payments in terms of the social security system. To the best of our knowledge, the
eﬀect of TFR on labour market and labour mobility is new. Further, the social security reform
approved by the Italian Parliament in 2006 that will go into full eﬀect in 2008 aims at using the
TFR to boost the second pillar of the social security system. Our results suggest that a shift of
TFR funds into pension funds will increase labour turnover, so that implementing such reform
would have a direct eﬀects in the social security area, and an indirect eﬀect on the labour market.
For example, when the 2006 reform will be implemented, an individual with at least ten years
of tenure will divert from the TFR to the pension fund the annual TFR quota, equivalent to
withdrawing less than 10% of the fund; his hazard would increase from 10% to about 10.4% in the
ﬁrst year (ﬁgure 5). A signiﬁcant but small eﬀect, that will obviously increase as time goes by and
TFRis "withdrawn" every year.
Appendix
I. The Solution with Flexible Wages
If wages were fully ﬂexible, and the ﬁrm and the worker shared the total surplus from the job,
mandatory deferred wages would not have any allocative impact. To see this simply deﬁne the
surplus from the job as
St(pt)=Πt(pt)+Wt
26and assume that the worker gets a fraction β of the total surplus in each and every period. The









t+1 St+1(z)dF(z) t =1 .(T − 1)
pt t = T
(16)
which is an expression that is independent of wages and deferred wages. This is not surprising, since
the total surplus is independent of a transfer between the two parts. The optimal separation policy
in this case would be St(ˆ pt)=0 . Proceeding backward it is clear that the reservation productivity
in this case would be ˆ pt =0and that the wage would simply be
w(pt)=( 1− δ)βpt
so that the marginal wage would be zero (w(ˆ pt)=0 ) . In words, deferred wages are irrelevant.
II. TFR increases ﬁrms’ proﬁts
To prove it, as long as δ>0 and r>˜ r, we just need to show that the derivative with respect to
δ of the ﬁrm present discounted value is positive. In our two periods speciﬁcation the ﬁrm present
discounted value reads
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Since the last expression in the brackets is zero by virtue of the reservation productivity Π2(p∗
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27III. The Impact of TFR on Workers’ Welfare
In the two periods version of the model, the welfare of the worker depends stochastically on the
probability of being employed at time t =2 . The welfare of the worker at the beginning of the
relationship is







(1 − δ)w +
1
1+r
[(1 + ˜ r)δw +( 1+˜ r)2δw]
¾
+ F(p∗
2)(1 + ˜ r)δw
¾
where the worker enjoys the current wage for certainty, while the value of the relationship at time
t =2depends on the probability that the worker is not ﬁred, which happens with probability
1 − F(p∗
2) where p∗
2 is determined by the ﬁrm continuation policy. To study the impact of TFR
we need to study ∂W1

















The formal value of the two derivatives is
∂W1
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The former is negative as long as
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˜ r<r
O u ra s s u m p t i o no nt h ew e l f a r ee ﬀect of TFRimplies assuming
∂W1
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IV. Withdrawing Shocks
Formally, the existence of a withdrawing shock modiﬁes the ﬁrm problem. Assuming that with-
drawing takes place at rate μ, the ﬁrm problem reads
Πt(pt)=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩



















t =1 ...(T − 1)
pt − (1 − δ)w − 1
1+rRt+1 t = T
(17)





(1 + ˜ r)δw if worker withdraws at t
(1 + ˜ r)[Rt + δw] if worker does not withdraw at t
with R1 =0 . Let us consider a ﬁrm at the beginning of the second period that is employing a worker
who has just withdrawn the stock of TFR. For such ﬁrm, the continuation policy is described by
the following reservation productivity ˜ p∗
2
0=˜ p∗
2 − (1 − δ)w −
1
1+r
[δw(1 + ˜ r)]
Conversely, when a ﬁrm is hiring a worker who has not withdrawn in the previous period, the
continuation policy would be as in eq. (4)
−R2 = p∗
2 − (1 − δ)w −
1
1+r















from which it follows that when a worker withdraws the TFR,t h eﬁrm reduces its incentive to
hold to marginal losses.
V. Firm initiated separations and sample selection: robustness check
Our separation indicator S is deﬁned as follows. We let U b et h el e n g t ho ft h en o ne m p l o y m e n t





0 − if the spell is right censored;
1 ﬁrm initiated separation, if U ≥ n and age at separation < 55;
2 quit, if U<nand age at separation < 55;
3 retirement, if age at separation ≥ 55.
The cloglog model always tests S =0vs S =1 .
The ﬁrst robustness check concerns n, the subsequent non employment spell length that deﬁnes
quits. We modify it from 0 months (all separations are ﬁrm initiated, provided that the worker is
younger than 55) to 4 months. We do not claim to disentangle quits from layoﬀs perfectly; what
we obtain, as we increase n, is to increase the share of pure ﬁrm initiated separations included in
29S =1 . This procedure let emerge more clearly the eﬀect of the withdrawal. Table 8, sample 2,
shows that while the coeﬃcient of withdrawal at t −1 is almost unaﬀected by n,t h ec o e ﬃcient of
withdrawal at t − 3 increases with n28. As expected, the labour hoarding eﬀect emerges stronger
in this case. n =2i st h eb e n c h m a r kc a s e ,u s e di nt h et e x t .
The second robustness check concerns the sample deﬁnition. Provided that we test S =0vs
S =1we can either include or exclude from the sample individuals for which S =2or S =3 .
Under the assumption of independence in competing risks, the destination-speciﬁc hazards (quit,
layoﬀ, retirement, censored spells) can be estimated separately (sample 1 in Table 8). This is
e x a c t l yt r u ei nc o n t i n u o u st i m em o d e l s ,w h e r ei ne v e r yi n s t a n to n l yo n ee x i tc a nb et a k e n .I no u r
case of interval-censored data this is only approximately true, accuracy depending on how small
destination speciﬁc hazards are (Jenkins, 2005). The alternative is selecting the sample to exclude
individuals quitting (S =2 )or retiring (S =3 ) , and to estimate the parameters speciﬁct ol a y o ﬀs
(S =1 )( s a m p l e2a n d3i nT a b l e8 ) .T h ed r a w b a c ki nt h eﬁrst case is the mentioned approximation;
in the second case it is the possibly endogenous sample selection introduced. Table 8 shows that
all this is non inﬂuential for our results. The coeﬃcients of interest are modiﬁed only marginally
by the sample used and their signiﬁcance never changes.
We choose sample 2 as the benchmark case (excluding only retirements from the sample). The
reason for this choice is clear from Table 9. To estimate all destination-speciﬁc hazards simulta-
neously we pretend just for this exercise to work with truly discrete time data, and we assume
a convenient multinomial logistic speciﬁcation of the hazard (thus abandoning the assumption of
proportional hazard). The results for S =1are coherent with those presented in section 7, as
a further robustness. The results for S =2conﬁrm that lag 1 withdrawal suﬀers from reverse
causality, while lag 3 does not. The results for S =3point to the fact that retirement time is
known well in advance, so that also lag 3 could be inﬂuenced by reverse causality. Hence, to be
very conservative we exclude retirements from the sample and in text we always use sample 2.
28Share of withdrawal. Log absolute withdrawal and dummy on withdrawal show exactly the same behaviour.
Results not reported.
30Table 8: Hazard rate estimate. Robustness over quit deﬁnition and sample selection.
sample 1 sample 2 (base) sample 3
β s.e. p value β s.e. p value β s.e. p value
U length >=0 months
withdrawal at t-1 0.2898 0.073 0 0.3285 0.075 0
withdrawal at t-2 0.0312 0.090 0.728 0.0841 0.093 0.366 no quits
withdrawal at t-3 0.1437 0.098 0.141 0.2093 0.101 0.039
U length >=1 month
withdrawal at t-1 0.3418 0.082 0 0.3354 0.083 0 0.3637 0.083 0
withdrawal at t-2 0.0107 0.105 0.919 0.0075 0.106 0.944 0.0323 0.105 0.759
withdrawal at t-3 0.1648 0.113 0.145 0.1806 0.113 0.109 0.1807 0.113 0.109
U length>=2 months (base)
withdrawal at t-1 0.3424 0.101 0.001 0.3324 0.101 0.001 0.3684 0.101 0
withdrawal at t-2 -0.0069 0.130 0.958 -0.0104 0.130 0.937 0.0121 0.130 0.926
withdrawal at t-3 0.2618 0.131 0.046 0.2741 0.131 0.036 0.2762 0.131 0.035
U length>=3 months
withdrawal at t-1 0.3548 0.103 0.001 0.3433 0.104 0.001 0.3954 0.104 0
withdrawal at t-2 -0.0878 0.137 0.522 -0.0924 0.138 0.503 -0.0620 0.137 0.652
withdrawal at t-3 0.2876 0.133 0.031 0.3002 0.133 0.024 0.3030 0.133 0.023
U length>=4 months
withdrawal at t-1 0.3226 0.106 0.002 0.3115 0.107 0.004 0.3655 0.107 0.001
withdrawal at t-2 -0.0867 0.140 0.535 -0.0911 0.140 0.516 -0.0641 0.140 0.647
withdrawal at t-3 0.3277 0.134 0.015 0.3408 0.134 0.011 0.3364 0.134 0.012
Deﬁnition of separation (S) and sample: sample 1 sample 2 sample 3
S=0 right censored spell in in in
S=1 ﬁring i.e. U length >=n months and age at sep<55 in in in
S=2 quit i.e. U length <n months and age at sep<55 in in out
S=3 retirement i.e. age at separation>=55 in out out
cloglog always tests separation=0 versus separation=1
Probability of ﬁrm initiated separation. Complementary log log model. Robust s.e.
Coeﬃ cients of interest only. Controls as in baseline speciﬁcation, not reported
Withdrawal is deﬁned as withdrawal rate.
31Table 9: Multinomial logit estimate.
β s.e. p value
S=1
withdrawal at t-1 0.384 0.107 0
withdrawal at t-2 0.014 0.136 0.918
withdrawal at t-3 0.305 0.139 0.028
S=2
withdrawal at t-1 0.316 0.117 0.007
withdrawal at t-2 0.187 0.136 0.171
withdrawal at t-3 0.122 0.165 0.459
S=3
withdrawal at t-1 -0.051 0.240 0.833
withdrawal at t-2 0.209 0.246 0.395
withdrawal at t-3 0.458 0.246 0.063
Deﬁnition of separation (S):





Coeﬃ cients of interest only. Controls as in baseline
speciﬁcation, not reported
Withdrawal is deﬁned as withdrawal rate.
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Figure 4: Kaplan-Meyer hazard, withdrawers and non withdrawers at t-3. First quintile of ﬁrm
size distribution only
35Increase in the instantaneous hazard due to withdraw at t-3

























































Figure 5: Odds ratios, bottom line speciﬁcation
36